9th
In the early hours of 9 July, 38th Division headquarters, then still under the command of Ivor Philipps, issued orders for an attack that afternoon on the southern edge of Mametz Wood from White Trench.' Two brigades were to take part: the 114th Brigade (Brig.-Gen. Marden) on the right making the main thrust east of the central ride, the 113th Brigade (Brig.-Gen. Price-Davies) supporting with a simultaneous attack by one battalion on Strip Trench. Once Strip Trench and the southernmost cross ride had been captured, the 114th Brigade was to sweep on alone northwards through the wood leaving the 113th Brigade to consolidate the southwestern approaches.
By midday, however, Ivor Philipps had been relieved of his command and XV Corps decided to postpone the attack. It sent the following message to the 38th Division:
The attack being prepared by you for 4 pm this afternoon will not take place. All preparations for making that attack are to be ready by early tomorrow morning.2
The words 'by you' are indicative of a significant change in XV Corps' control of operations. Previously, it had planned each attack itself in great detail. Now it seemed content to lay down guidelines and let divisions work out their own tactics.
Direct orders were now replaced by advice, and in some messages it even pleaded for a particular course of action to be followed. It would be tempting to put this down to lessons learned on 7 July but it is more likely that corps headquarters was simply too busy preparing for the forthcoming attack on Bazentin ridge to spare much time for Mametz Wood.
At 2 pm XV Corps sent a message to divisions urging them not to dissipate their efforts on piecemeal attacks:
All prisoners captured in the last 24 hours express astonishment that our infantry does not attack in greater strength instead of bombing up trenches in twos or threes.
The enemy is much in confusion there being small groups here and there of every regiment. There are some stretches of country without any enemy in it at all. If our infantry attacked in strength they could sweep the whole of them back..All communications trenches to the rear are smashed. This information confirms that already received from aircraft and other sources. Corps commander impresses on all commanders the necessity of utmost vigour and determination in the attacks to be delivered today and great results which accrue therefrom. He looks to divisional commanders ensuring his directions on this point are carried out.3
XV Corps was, however, still willing to fragment its own resources, and asked 17th Division to have one last fling against Quadrangle Support trench before being relieved in the line by the 21st Division. Corps staff urged a surprise attack that evening using troops that had rested the previous night. `Machine guns should not stop fresh troops if they mean to get in,' they said optimistically. 'Impress upon your troops that they are going to be relieved tomorrow night, that it is up to them to make their reputation by taking the trench before they go.'
23rd Division (III Corps) on the left had arranged to make another attack on Contalmaison at 6 pm. The 17th could not join in so soon, and in any case preferred to wait for darkness. On the right, as we have seen, the attack by 38th Division had been postponed until the following day. No attempt was made to coordinate the efforts of these three units and the unfortunate 17th Division went into the attack again completely unsupported on either flank.
At 11 pm, the division launched the 51st Brigade against the junction of Quadrangle Support and Pearl Alley, and 50th Brigade against the junction of Quadrangle Support and Quadrangle Alley (see Map 8) as it had done so many times before. After a hard night's fighting the 51st Brigade managed to capture the western half of Quadrangle support but was soon driven back along it to the junction with Pearl Alley where it hung on grimly. The 50th Brigade, however, was less successful and at 3.30 am on the mill the attack was called off.4
On the right, Maj.-Gen. Watts assumed command of the 38th (Welsh) Division during the afternoon of 9 July. He took with him several members of 7th Division staff including the GSO 1, Lt.Col. Bonham Carter, who was to become the main point of contact between the division and XV Corps. The original staff of 38th Division was not entirely eclipsed, however, and orders to the three brigades continued to be sent out by Lt. Col. ap Rhys Pryce who was also to do good work in the field.
Although Watts had been given a free hand by XV Corps to dispose of brigades as he wished, he decided not to break up the Welsh division but to employ it en masse against the southern edge of Mametz Wood, putting two brigades into the initial attack with the third close behind. In this, he was not departing very far from the plans previously worked out by Ivor Philipps's staff, but by giving the 113th Brigade an equal part to play with the 114th Brigade he much increased the weight of attack and thus improved the chances of success. The artillery programme was, however, considerably revised to make use of techniques developed by both British and French in recent fighting.
Orders for the attack were ready by 5.30 pm on 9 July (see Annex B). That evening, the brigadiers of the 113th and 114th brigade were called to divisional headquarters at Grovetown 'and given orders by a GOC and staff, whom they had never seen before, to capture Mametz Wood at dawn on 10 July, zero hour being fixed for 4.15 am's. As Grovetown was six miles away from the brigade headquarters it was nearly midnight before brigade staffs were fully in the picture. This gave them only three hours at most in which to alert battalions and move them into position, but, in contrast to the situation on 7 July, there had been ample opportunity beforehand for battalion commanders to make a reconnaissance of the approaches to the wood. That evening, corps headquarters sent the following message which was read out to all troops before dawn the next day:
The Commander in Chief has just visited the corps commander and has impressed upon him the great importance of the occupation by us of Mametz Wood. The corps commander requests that the division and brigade commanders will point out to Ow hoops ()I t he Welsh division I he opportunity oftered them of serving their King and Country at a critical period and earning for themselves great glory and distinction!
The artillery programme apart, there was little subtlety in the plan of attack which relied solely on weight of numbers to overrun the German defences. There were to be no feints, no outflanking manoeuvres: just a straightforward attack in orthodox 'wave' formation across unpromising ground from White Trench south of the wood (see Map 10), down the steep embankment, across the open ground and up a gently rise to the southernmost edge of the wood where the Germans had constructed shallow firing trenches. A distance of some 500 yards of open ground had to be covered. 114th Brigade (Brig.-Gen. Marden) was to attack east of the central ride; 113th Brigade (Brig.-Gen. Price-Davies) on its left advancing on a narrow front between Strip Trench and the central ride. The first objective was the capture by 6.15 am of the area south of the first cross ride and also the Hammerhead. Once in the wood, the two brigades were to keep in touch along the central ride which would be neatly marked with red flags as the troops advanced.7
The artillery programme, however, contained two novel features. The first of these had been evolved by the French to draw enemy troops out of of their dug-outs and expose them to shell fire. The technique, which at that time was not in general use on the British front, was to bombard the enemy front line, lift towards the rear as if an infantry attack was about to be launched, and then drop back on the front line a few minutes later as the enemy came out to man the parapets. There were many variants, some including simulated infantry attacks, but the one adopted by the combined artilleries of the 7th and 38th Divisions was as follows. From 3.30 am to 4 am, every available 18-pounder was first to bombard the southern edge of the wood and then 'search' back for a distance of 200 yards. From 4 am to 4.10 am the bombardment would be switched back to the edge of the wood, all 18-pounders and 4.5 inch howitzers firing three rounds per gun per minute for ten minutes and then firing as rapidly as possible for another five minutes before making the final lift in advance of the attacking infantry.
The second feature was the use of a creeping barrage, then in the early stages of development, although it had been tried out tentatively as ly as the battle of Loos in 1915 and had been used by XIII Corps on 1 July 1916. A barrage, as the name suggests, is nut aimed at any particular target but is intended to form a barrier between the attacking infantry and enemy reinforcements. Originally it had been put down well ahead of attacking troops - often on the enemy support trenches - but the advantage of keeping it as close as possible to the infantry soon became apparent. The ultimate development was to move the barriage forward at walking pace with the infantry following very close behind. For the attack on Mametz Wood it was arranged that at 4.15 am the barrage would lift back from the southern edge of the wood by steps of 50 yards each minute to a line just north of the first cross ride and west of the Hammerhead where it would remain until 6.15 am giving the infantry time to consolidate their positions. The barrage was then to lift slowly back, this time coming to rest just north of the second ride. At 7.15 am it was to be lifted again to the northern edge of the wood, and one hour later to the German second line beyond the wood.8 The bombardment areas allocated to the various artillery groups and batteries are shown in Map 9 which is constructed from operational orders issued by the commander of the 7th Division's artillery.
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