Not until 10 July
- three days after the projected date for the capture of Mametz Wood - did Haig
learn of Rawlinson's daring plan. He was not very happy; partly because it involved an uphill
attack over 1,000 yards of ground but mainly because he just did not believe it would be possible
to form up divisions 'in mass in the dark; which we cannot do in time of peace'.8 But Rawlinson
continued to argue the merits of his plan, strongly supported by General Montgomery, his chief of
staff, and by Lt.-Gen. Home, commander of the XV Corps. On 12 July Haig finally acquiesced,
insisting only that strong points should be built to protect the troops assembling on the southern
slopes. While these discussions were taking place, the 17th and 38th Divisions were hurling
themselves at Mametz Wood in a desperate attempt to secure its early capture. Ironically, by the
time Haig had come around to Rawlinson's way of thinking, the wood was in British hands. It is a
sad commentary on the conduct of the war that both commanders could issue orders for
preliminary attacks, which were to cost thousands of lives, without first having an agreed plan for
the main battle.
Shortly before
the attack, 18th Division, on the XIII Corps front, was relieved in Caterpillar Wood
by the 3rd Division. This, however, was in preparation for the forthcoming assault on Bazentin
ridge; 3rd Division was to play no part in the fighting for Mametz Wood. 38th Division therefore
retained a presence in Caterpillar Wood from which to command the eastern edge of Mametz
Wood. To the left of the 38th, 17th (Northern) Division was continuing its struggle to capture
Quadrangle Support trench. Its role on 10 July was to support the left flank of the 38th Division
until relieved in the evening by the 21st Division. Further to the left, on the III Corps front, 23rd
Division was to continue its attempt to capture Contalmaison.
As on 7th July,
the southern edge of Mametz Wood was held by the 2nd Battalion (Companies 5,
6, 7 and 8) of the Lehr Infantry Regiment (3rd Guards Division). Behind it were units from other
divisions including part of the 3rd Battalion, 16th Bavarian Regiment, and of the 2nd Battalion,
184th Regiment. Wood Trench and Wood support were held by the 3rd Battalion of the
122nd(Wurttemburg) Reserve Regiment (183rd Reserve Infantry Division) which had relieved
the 163rd Regiment a few days before. Other battalions of the 122nd Reg
East of the wood,
the 3rd Battalion of the Lehr Regiment continued to hold the German second
line from Bazentin le Petit Wood to Bazentin le Grand and also the positions forward of this
around Flatiron and Sabot Copses. Northwest of the wood, the second line was occupied by a
mixed force of the 1st Battalion Lehr Regiment and the Fusilier Battalion of the 9th Grenadier
Guards, both well under strength and bath shaken as a result of earlier fighting in defence of
Contalmaison.
With such a mixture
of units, and with both British and German battalions at less than full
strength, it is impossible accurately to estimate the relative strength of the two sides. One German
soured° puts the ratio of battalions on this part of the front at four to one in favour of the
British:
three British divisions (23rd, 17th and 38th) of twelve battalions each, against three German
regiments (183rd, which was west of Contalmaison, 122nd Reserve and Lehr) of three battalions
each, but this ignores the other German units mentioned above and thus overstates the British
advantage. It seems probable, however, that the British infantry outnumbered the German by at
least three to one. The Germans, of course, had the advantage of being on the defensive in well
prepared positions and their troops were in general much more highly trained and experienced in
battle. The Lehr Regiment, for example, which was to bear the brunt of the attack at Mametz
Wood, had previously fought on the Russian front.11
The morning of
10 July was fair and bracing. By 3 am the leading battalions of the 38th Division
were in position between White Trench and the brow of the cliff waiting, nervously, for zero
hour. They were to attack in parallel lines, or 'waves', as they had practised in manoeuvres, with
bayonets fixed and rifles held in the high port position, four paces between each man, 100 yards
between each line, the 16th RWF leading for the 113th Brigade with 14th RWF close behind; and
the 13th and 14th Welsh, side by side, leading on the 114th Brigade front (see Map 10).12 David
Jones, a private soldier with the 15th RWF in close support on the left in Queen's Nullah, has
captured the feeling of tension among the waiting infantry:
Racked
out to another turn of the screw
the
acceleration heightens;
the
sensibility of these instruments to register,
fails;
needle
dithers disorientate.
The
responsive mercury plays laggard to such fevers - you simply can't take any more in.
And
the surfeit of fear steadies to dumb incognition, so that when they gave the order to move
upwards to align with `A', hugged already just under the lip of the activity
inches
below where his traversing machine guns
perforate
to powder white -
white
creatures of chalk pounded
and
the world crumbled away
and
get ready to advance
you
have not capacity for added fear...13
On the left, the
16th RWF sang hymns in Welsh and Lt. Col. Carden addressed his men with
religious fervour. 'Boys, make your peace with God! We are going to take that position and some
of us won't come back. But we are going to take it.'14 At 3.30 am the artillery opened up as
planned and 20 minutes later a smoke screen, laid just south of Strip Trench, drifted effectively
north-eastwards. As zero hour approached, the two leading battalions of the 114th Brigade,
having the greater distance to travel, moved off early, at 4.09 am, so as to be near the wood
when the artillery lifted off the southern edge. This seems to have taken the 16th RWF by
surprise and caused a moment of confusion. Carden had gone over to the 114th Brigade staff for
consultation and was still away when the 13th and 14th Welsh moved off. His second in
command, Major McLellan, assumed that Carden had become a casualty and gave the word to
advance:
On reaching the
brow of the hill, the leading lines saw the 114th Brigade, or parts of it, retiring
and they too wavered. Some went forward but almost all returned to their previous positions. This
was not a headlong flight but was done slowly and was largely owing to someone who cannot be
traced raising a shout of 'Retire'.
Almost immediately
after this, Col. Carden returned and the advance began again. Captain
Westbrooke and Lt. Venables had shown great coolness in pulling their men together, and This
time the movement was carried out in goodorder. All the officers state that the advance down the
hillside under heavy artillery and machine gun fire was executed with perfect steadiness.15
The delay however
cost the the battalion the protection of its own artillery, and enemy fire from
the edge of the wood and from Quadrangle Alley and Wood Trench soon broke up the formation.
Carden, a conspicuous figure with his stick held high, was wounded and fell, but he struggled on
to the edge of the wood where he was killed.16 The two companies of the 14th Battalion RWF
following closely behind likewise ran into heavy fire when about 200 yards from the wood. Their
commanding officer, Major Gwyther, was badly wounded and Capt. Glynn Jones gave the order
to reform in a cutting at the bottom of the cliff. Later he described the descent down the cliff as
he saw it from his position in the third wave:
Machine
guns and rifles began to rattle, and there was a general state of pandemonium, little of
which I can remember except that I myself was moving down the slope at a rapid rate, with bullet-
holes in my pocket and yelling a certain amount. I noticed also that there was no appearance
whatsoever of waves about the movement at this time, and that the men in advance of us were
thoroughly demoralised. Out of the most terrible 'mix-up' I have ever seen I collected all the men I
could see and ordered them into the cutting. There appeared to be no one ahead of us, no one
following us, and by this time it was broad daylight and the ridge behind us was being subjected
to a terrible artillery and machine gun fire.
I
well remember thinking 'Here comes the last stand of the old Carnarvon and Angleseys' as I
orded the men to get ready, and posted a Lewis gun on each of my flanks...Meanwhile, men were
crawling in from shell-holes to our front, with reports of nothing less than a terrible massacre, and
the names of most of our officers and ncos lying dead in front.17
On the far right,
the Lehr Regiment had placed a machine gun company skilfully on the underside
of the Hammerhead (see Map 10) and its fire caught the leading waves of the 13th Welsh (2nd
Rhondda) in the !Link as Ihey approached the wood. Sgt. Pricc described the scene:
We
attacked in a two company frontage, A and B Company 13th Welsh leading, followed by C
and D. I was in A Company, No 2 platoon.
We
were loaded up with four Mills bombs each in our pockets and four bandoliers of ammunition
across our shoulders, which was quite heavy and which made the approach to the wood quite a
physical task.
As
the barrage started we moved off in quite an orderly fashion...The tension and noise cannot be
described, what with the traction of shells through the air and the noise of explosions all around
us, it was almost impossible to give verbal orders and we had to rely on hand signals for directing
any move.
Men
were falling in all directions due to intense machine gun fire coming against us. How we got
to the wood I do not know; but we got there and entered it for a short distance before the Germans
came at us - head on - and there was quite a lot of action before we were forced to retreat back into
the field again, where we got into shell holes or any other form of cover we could get. The
Germans followed us to the edge of the wood but as our lines were then able to fire on them they
quickly returned to the protection of the tree stumps.18
As C and D Companies
came forward, a second attempt was made to enter the wood. This was
also repulsed but a third attempt was more successful and the 13th Welsh pushed on into the
wood.
In the centre,
the Swansea battalion (14th Welsh) had the advantage of being protected by others
from enfilade fire. The battalion crossed the open ground in perfect formation and arrived at the
edge of the wood just as the barrage was lifting back. The artillery tactics here worked well and
there were few casualties among the first waves of infantry. The rear waves were not so
fortunate, however, and several officers fell, including the second in command and three of the
four company commanders. Once in the wood the battalion found it difficult to make progress.
The undergrowth was thick and the central ride almost indistinguishable. 'Many of the shells,
probably from both sides, hit the trees above us, detonated and caused us more casualties,' Sgt.
Lyons of D Company recollected long afterwards. 'Progress through the wood was slow due
mainly to German machine gun fire but also to the density of the undergrowth in the wood. This
also impeded visibility. It was difficult to maintain our sense of direction but I was helped in this
by being able to tell the difference between the sound of our guns and the Germans'.'19
On the left, the
16th RWF also entered the wood, the bombers successfully pushing up Strip
Trench in spite of severe casualties. The undergrowth was not so thick in this part of the wood
but British shells had blown trees across the trench and at one point water was pouring in from a
nearby pond. One of the bombers, Private Griffith Jones, remembered moving up through the mud:
I
came up against a foot-thick tree trunk. I decided not to go underneath as the mud would be up
to my neck so I lifted one leg over it...[I saw] a German behind a bush about 25 yards away
levelling his rifle at me. I threw myself back...land] was hit by a bullet in the leg. Eventually I
got up
in the mud and felt a burning pain and saw the mud-covered putties red with blood. I took the
bayonet off my rifle and using the rifle as a crutch I trudged along back down the trench. When I
came to the open I fell down exhausted and was taken away by stretcher bearer."
The 16th RWF was
soon joined by the 15th RWF (London Welsh), whom Brig.-Gen. Price-
Davies had committed to the attack almost from the outset, and later by two companies of the
13th RWF -the last of the 113th Brigade's four battalions. The Germans were now surrendering
in large numbers and the three RWF battalions, pushing out patrols in all directions, were able to
move towards the first cross ride, joining up en route with the 6th Dorsets (of 17th Division) in
Wood Trench.
At about this time,
Capt. Glynn Jones, with the remnants of the 14th RWF still gathered in the
cutting below the embankment, saw about 40 German soldiers leaving the wood with their hands
up
Suspecting
a trick, I ordered my men to cover them, but allowed them to approach us. When they
got about halfway I went out to meet them, accompanied by a sergeant, and sent them hack to out
headquatters. As this appeared to point to tin- wood h•ing unoccupied, I sent a small patrol to
examine it; and then we all moved forward. Crossing the trench on the fringe of it, we entered the
wood at the entrance of the main ride, and with two patrols in front advanced up the ride in file, as
the undergrowth was very thick.2I
Meanwhile, on the
114th Brigade front, the 13th and 14th Welsh, now reinforced by 10th Welsh
(1st Rhondda), also made progress towards the first cross ride which they reached, and then
passed, at about 5 am while the barrage was still falling on it. `We suffered many casualties from
our own shell fire', the 13th Welsh diary records, 'Major Bond being killed. When it was realised it
was our own barrage we were in and not that of the Hun, the order to withdraw was given and
the battalion withdrew for a time. During the interval we fell in with the 10th Welsh coming up to
reinforce and got in touch with the 14th Welsh. Lt. Col. Hayes (14th Welsh) ordered the battalion
to dig in along the ride at E' (see Map 10). Hayes had earlier sent a message to brigade
headquarters asking for the artillery to be lifted right back to the German second line. Brig.-Gen.
Marden relayed the message to the artillery but the request was refused. The artillery stuck to its
programme and Hayes was told to strengthen his position and to be ready to advance at the
appointed hour. According to the official history, this `afforded the enemy such a respite that he
thought better of evacuating the wood completely,' orders to this effect having been written at
4.15 am by the local German commander.22
In spite of this,
however, the first stage of the attack had been quite successful. Hammerhead on
the right and Wood Support trench on the left were still in German hands, but otherwise the first
objective had been captured well ahead of timetable, though at considerable cost. Even at this
early stage, seven battalions had been committed. Five of these had lost their commanders, either
killed or badly wounded, Lt. Col. Ricketts of the 10th Welsh having been hit several times while
bringing his battalion forward in support. Casualties had also been high among the other officers
making it difficult to exercise control over the many thousands of men already in the wood. The
British High Command was however well content, Haig in particular expressing his satisfaction
with morning reports that two brigades had succeeded in entering the wood.n
It the lighting
so far in Mametz Wood had been hectic and confused on the British side, it was no
less so tor the Germans. At 4.15 am, as the 38th Division penetrated the southern edge of the
wood, the 5th Company of the Lehr Regiment became trapped between the 16th RWF pushing
up Strip Trench and the 14th Welsh in the centre. Some of the guardsmen, as we have seen, left
the wood and surrendered to Capt. Glynn Jones's group at the foot of the cliff, but others held
their ground until overrun. The 7th and 8th Companies, however, under Lt. Pfeiffer, worked their
way skilfully back towards the northern edge of the Hammerhead to join up with the 3rd Battalion
at Flatiron Copse. The machine gun company at the southeast corner of the wood also withdrew
successfully, and although two guns were lost, another three kept up a deadly fire as they moved
from shell hole to shell hole back towards the second line. In the centre, remnants of the 6th
Company joined up with two platoons of the 16th Bavarian Infantry Regiment and held on until
the afternoon, when they too were forced back towards the second line.24
At 6.15 am the
British artillery began its ponderous programme of slow lifts to the second cross
ride, the infantry following closely behind. The Royal Welsh Fusiliers on the left, however, met
strong opposition at Wood Support trench and at the corner of the wood - point J on Map 11 -
where the 2nd Battalion of the German 122nd Infantry Regiment had its headquarters in a well-
defended redoubt. Lt.Col. Flowers was therefore sent forward with the last two companies of the
13th RWF 'to find out the exact situation and reorganise the Brigade'.25 Shortly afterwards, Price-
Davies received permission from division headquarters to enter the wood and together with
Lt.Col. Gossett of the Fourth Army staff he made his way up Strip Trench, where he was
distressed to see a party of men 'running back in panic'. David Jones, who also witnessed this
incident, put it down to lack of supervision. 'Something must have developed, if not into a panic, at
least into a disorderly falling back – simply because of not having precise directions.'26
Order was, however,
soon restored and the two fresh companies of the 13th RWF began to
advance through the troops in front of them, one company being given the task of holding the first
cross ride, the other of pushing ahead into the wood. When they reached the cross ride, however,
both companies became caught up in the confused fighting amongst the tangled trees and little
further progress was made that morning.
Over at Flatiron
Copse things were a little easier for the Germans, although the 3rd Battalion of
the Lehr Regiment had suffered heavy losses during the artillery bombardment of this area.
However, as no infantry attacked followed, the regimental commander, Lt.Col. Kumme, urged
the battalion to send help to the 2nd Battalion in Mametz Wood. Major von Kriegsheim, the
battalion commander, sent off one platoon each from the 9th, 10th and 12th Companies and to
these was added a platoon from the 5th Company, 184th Infantry Regiment. This group, under Lt.
Kummetz, reached the eastern edge of the wood at about 9 am, joined up with the 7th and 8th
Companies, and created havoc among British troops in the Hammerhead. Later on, Major von
Kriegsheim sent another platoon to join this force but only under pressure from his superiors, and
even then with great reluctance. He had still not ruled out the possibility that the British might
launch a flanking attack east of the wood and he saw little strategic value in weakening the
second line at that point.
Meanwhile, as the
13th Welsh on the right was failing to make progress in the Hammerhead, the
last of the 114th Brigade's four battalions - the Carmarthenshire (15th Welsh) - was sent in to
help. Together, the 13th and 15th Welsh pushed through the Hammerhead almost to point X (see
Map 11) but were then driven back by Lt. Kummetz's group which had managed to get in behind
two companies of the 15th Welsh and ambush two platoons. Machine gun and rifle fire caught
the Welshmen in the rear and of the two platoons (about 100 men) only four men found their way
back to the battalion. The 15th Welsh fell back on the line DE, with its left in touch with other
battalions on the first cross ride.27 Thus by midmorning the British line in the wood ran roughly
from point J on the left, through F to D and thence in a southeasterly direction to the edge of the
wood (see Map 11).
Shortly after 9
am, at the request of 38th Division headquarters, the heavy artillery had fired for
15 minutes on the wood north of the second ride and on the German second line. But this did not
stop German reinforcements from arriving, and large parties of them were seen entering the
wood from the north at about 9.35 am.28 At 10.30, Brig.-Gen. Marden put Lt.Col. Hayes (14th
Welsh) in charge of all forces east of the central ride and ordered him to advance to the second
cross ride. This he did successfully in the centre, pushing forward about 200 yards before being
held up for lack of support on the right.
As the wood had
now swallowed up all his troops, and little progress was being made, Marden
sought permission to enter the wood to see the position for himself and to reorganise. Maj.-Gen.
Watts, however, refused to let him go and instead sent in from the 115th Brigade the two
battalions that had suffered least on 7 July: the 17th RWF going to the assistance of the 113th
Brigade on the left, and the 10th SWB (1st Gwent) to the 114th Brigade on the right. To ease
congestion, the 15th and the 16th RWF were withdrawn temporarily from the wood. The fresh
troops arrived at about 2.40 pm and gave new impetus to the attack. After another bombardment,
the two battalions began to push forward, the 17th RWF bypassing the end of Wood Support
trench and the German strong point nearby. To its left, the 13th RWF bombed down Wood
Support trench to meet troops of the 17th (Northern) Division approaching from the other end.
On the right, the 10th SWB also made good progress, pushing forward to the line YV (see Map
12) with some patrols penetrating almost to the northeastern corner of the wood. Eventually,
however, the battalion was brought to a halt by machine gun fire from the northern edge of the
Hammerhead.
At 3 pm, Marden
was allowed to enter the wood where he conferred with Price-Davies and
Lt.Col. Rhys Pryce, the GSO 1 of 38th Division, who had come forward with the reserves.
Between them, they decided to straighten out the line and, at 4.30 pm, to make a concerted
sweep through the wood. In this attack, the 17th RWF supported by the 14th and 15th Welsh
made considerable progress against little opposition on the ground, although German snipers in the
trees inflicted many casualties.
By 6.30 pm, the
battalion had reached to within 30 or 40 yards of the far edge of the wood. The
10th SWB, which had been tasked with clearing the Hammerhead, pushed between Lt.
Kummetz's group and other German forces in the wood. Major von Kriegsheim thereupon orded
the withdrawal of Kummetz's group leaving the Hammerhead in the hands of the 10th SWB. On
the far left, however, the 13th RWF, which had to spread out westward to cover the wider part
of the wood, fell behind and it was some time before it caught up with the other battalions. With
the front now close to the German second line, the troops came under very heavy machine gun
fire and were withdrawn to a line 200 or 300 yards from the northern edge of the wood, with the
left flank pulled back along the railway line (see Map 12). Here they dug in for the night. By now
the men were tired and jumpy, aswell .e.lv m need of water. There was a great deal of wild tiring
during the night and some men panicked down the central ride when the Germans threatened a
counter attack. Eventually order was restored and the exhausted men fell asleep.
During the evening,
the German High Command, having completely underestimated the number
of British troops in the wood and the extent to which they had penetrated, had ordered the wood
to be held at all costs; at 7 pm, it sent in the 2nd Battalion of the 184th Infantry Regiment to
recapture the wood, assisted by a company of pioneers hastily converted to a fighting role.
Together, the two units pushed through the wood from the north until they met the British troops
dug in on a line 200 yards from the edge of the wood. Realising the strength of the opposition,
they too dug themselves in.
Outside the wood,
the 17th Division finally captured Quadrangle Support trench, but not before
Contalmaison had fallen to the 23rd Division at about 5.30 pm. Attempts earlier in the day to
capture the trench by bombing up Pearl Alley and Quadrangle Alley had ended in disaster. Lt.
Kostlin, in command of a company of the German 122nd Infantry Reserve Regiment holding
Quadrangle Support at the time, has described how, in one such attack, the 7th East Yorks,
finding Quadrangle Alley blocked 20 yards short of the junction with Support trench, attempted to
cross in the open towards him:
My
sentries...noticed helmets moving about above ground level at the sap-head [in Quadrangle
Alley] and kept it under careful watch. Each time the men began to climb up out of the sap-head
and run forward at us with bombs, the sentries gave the alarm, and we were able to greet them with
heavy fire at point-blank range. Then others crowded at the sap-head and repeated the effort, but
with equal failure and by midday a heap of British dead and wounded lay about the sap-head.
After dark, however,
with Contalmaison taken and the Welsh Division well advanced in Mametz
Wood, Lt. Kostlin and his men, threatened on three sides, made good their escape to the rear:
The
ground behind our trench was being continually shelled, but about midnight the fire ceased
and we decided to rush for it. The plan worked successfully, and although a number of men were
wounded by shells and stray bullets we succeeded, a total of live officers and 120 men, in reaching
the barbed wire entanglements in front of the second line position at 1.30 am. Here we were
greeted by a machine gunwhich suddenly opened from the trench, but throwing ourselves on the
ground and shouting we soon convinced the gunner of his error and luckily with no cost to
ourselves.29
Thus as 10 July
drew to a close, and the 17th (Northern) Division handed its part of the front
back to 21st Division, the British were established in Contalmaison; in most of Mametz Wood;
and in the trenches in between. Everything seemed set for for the advance on the German
second line. 'Another day of heavy fighting,' Rawlinson wrote in his journal. 'The 38th Division
succeeded in capturing practically the whole of Mametz Wood and the III Corps also took
Contalmaison. In these circumstances I have decided to begin the bombardment of their second
line tomorrow and to attack it on the 13th at dawn, weather permitting.'3° Haig was also well
satisfied as he toured army and corps headquarters that evening. 'I saw Gen. Horne, commanding
XV Corps at Heilly,' he wrote. 'He reported that Gen. Watts (Comdg 7th Division) had
temporarily taken command of the 38th Welsh Division and had nearly got the whole of Mametz
Wood. What an effect on the division has a good commander!'3110
