All who have studied
the battle of the Somme agree that the first day. July 1 1915 stands out
from all other battles of the British Army in terms of the great number of casualities and the small
amount of ground taken.
It took another
eleven days before the options to fulfil the battle plan was exhausted.
Mametz Wood in
context 2-13 July
Phase 2
On the first day
of the battle, 1st July, the 30th Division (XIII Corps) at the very right of the
British
attack achieved the greatest advance at the least cost of any British division that day. This
applied particulary to 89 Brigade, which attacked alongside the French. Montauban had all but
been obliterated and when the advance consolidated to the north east of the village at Montauban
Alley the troops of the 30th Division could see the Germans flooding back towards their second
line. In contrast X Corps which had attacked at the extreme left failed to take the Thiepval Ridge
and had suffered 10,000 casualities with no permanent gain of ground.
On reflection it
was soon realised that there was no choice to be made with respect to the next
phase. The line around Thiepval could not be assailed. Further to the north Gough, whom
Rawlinson had placed in command of the Northern VIII Corps, reported that the dead and
wounded were still choking all communication trenches. To remove them and bring in fresh units
would have meant a suspension of operations for some days, a situation no commander was
prepared to contemplate. On closer inspection most of the X Corps area was found to be little
better. So it was decided by Haig and Rawlinson that the next phase of operations on the
2nd
July must be confined to securing the southern sector, from Ovillers to Bernafay Wood, where
some progress had been made. The objectives emerged as Contalmaison, Mametz Wood and
Trones Wood (east of Montauban)
These operations
commenced promisingly. On the 2nd, a patrol from 7 Division found that the
Germans had evacuated the Fricourt Salient. The 7, the newly introduced 17, and the 21 Divisions
linked up behind the village and wood, in the process considerably shortening the British line.
The advance in
the south was not accompanied by any progress to its immediate left. Here the
main effort consisted of an attempt by III Corps to capture Ovillers and La Boisselle.
`"
This operation was to be undertaken by two new formations, the 19 Division which had taken
over much of the front of 34 Division on the night of 1 July, and the 12 Division which had
relieved the shattered 8 Division on the night of 2 July."
The X Corps were
to provide flank support by attacking just south of Thiepval.
La Boiselle
This attack, was
to be carried out over the same ground which had brought disaster to III Corps
on 1 July. However, a minor operation by 19 Division on the afternoon of the 2nd had captured
the southern tip of La Boisselle and this raised expectations that the German defence in the areas
had been weakened by the events on the first day more than was apparent. Perhaps for this
reason, it was decided by III Corps that the major operation should be immediate. But because of
the great width of no man's land along this section of the front it was clear that the main attack
must take place by night. However, neither the 12 nor the 19 Division had made a major attack
even in daytime. Moreover they were so new to the area that detailed reconnaissance was
required to acquaint the divisions with the German defences. Instead, a rushed offensive was
ordered. So there was no time for reconnaissance and the preliminary bombardment consisted of
desultory artillery fire for only one hour.
The attack commenced
on 3 July with the 19 Division advancing on La Boisselle from the north
and south. At first the battle developed promisingly for the British with the troops entering the
village, bombing their way through the rubble and reaching its eastern end. But, as one of the
battalion accounts acknowledges, success was brief. The numerous dug-outs in the ruins held
many snipers who had to be bombed out and as a result hand grenades soon ran short.
Coherence between units proved hard to maintain in the dark and for reinforcements the location
of the forward units was hard to find. Further, the whole scheme was too hurried, no time being
allowed to explain to the men what was required of them." Hence rapid advance on both sides of
the village was followed by rapid retreat as bombs ran out, small groups of men found themselves
unsupported on the flanks, and local counter-attacks by the German garrison developed: Soon the
whole of the 19 Division was pushed back to within loo yards of their start line. The cost cannot
have been fewer than 1,000 men."
Meanwhile events
further north were proceeding with even greater confusion. In the first place
the flanking support from X Corps failed to develop because their trenches were still blocked with
the dead and wounded from the first day." So when 12 Division attacked they were unsupported
on the left and had not proceeded far across no man's land when they were met by heavy
enfilade fire from that direction:8 Some troops penetrated the first and second German trenches
but by then the enemy was firing such a strong artillery barrage on no man's land and the British
assembly trenches that no reinforcement was possible. One of the leading battalions which had
suffered over 400 casualties noted with some bitterness that they had received no assistance
from their supporting unit, but the fact was that the latter formation had lost 275 men in trying to
leave its own trenches:9 Wisely, the commander had cancelled further plans to advance.
On the right, even
without being subjected to enfilade fire, things were no better. The front units
entered the German trenches, but then the enemy artillery barrage came down, reinforcements
either lost their way in the dark or were wiped out, and ammunition for the front troops ran low.
Consequently they were forced to withdraw. In all, 12 Division in its introduction to Somme
fighting lost 2,375 casualties for no ground gained.' In his report the divisional commander listed
the reasons for failure. They are well summarised in the divisional history:
The
capture of the position had failed, and the failure was un-doubtedly affected by the flanking
machine gun fire, which was unmolested, and raked the excessive distance between the opposing
front lines over which supports had to cross. Also by the attack being carried out in the dark by
troops who were hurried into the fight without being well acquainted with the terrain, leading to
loss of cohesion; by the artillery bombardment destroying the wire and trenches, yet failing to
reach the deep dug-outs, which remained unharmed; and the recent storms making shell holes and
trenches in places almost unpassable.
New goals
Despite this setback
on the 3rd, Haig and Rawlinson were determined to push on. Later that day
the Fourth Army commander expressed his intensions. His goal was to push within striking
distance of the German second line between the Bazentin Ridge and Longueval, and then make
an all-out assault. To this end three things were required. The III Corps were to capture Bailiff
Wood and Contalmaison, XV Corps was to secure Mametz Wood, and XIII Corps was to occupy
in the first instance Caterpillar and Bernafay Woods, and then Trones Wood."
In the following
days the only action of the command was to reiterate these orders, exhorting that
operations be vigorous, so as to take advantage of the disarray into which the Germans had
allegedly fallen. For example, on the 4th Haig stated that the enemy's strength was diminishing
and his reserves were worn down. Hence he ordered Rawlinson to 'continue the operations
relentlessly and allow the enemy no respite'.' Two days later GHQ had reached the conclusion
that the enemy was on the brink of collapse. Rawlinson was told that Intelligence indicated the
Germans had few reserves with which to reinforce the 15 battered battalions in the line, and in
view of the conclusive evidence of considerable loss of morale and confusion on the enemy's side
you will realise that successes gained can and should be followed up more boldly than would be
wise under conditions less favourable to us.... There is good evidence that we have reached a
stage where serious demoralization may set in at any time, possibly tomorrow."
Similar missives
(despite the enemy's refusal to adhere to GHQ's demoralisation schedule)
followed in the next few days.
Rawlinson, for
his part, apparently saw no role for himself other than to act as a conduit passing
GHQ's euphoric predictions on to his corps commanders. He certainly saw no need for Fourth
Army headquarters to act as a co-ordinating body to ensure that corps attacks were
simultaneous, supported by as much artillery as possible and assailing objectives with appropriate
strength.
Contalmaison
The results of
this laissez-faire approach to command need to be grasped. In one section of the
front between 5 and 10 July, the 23 Division of III Corps launched eight attacks against
Contalmaison and the trenches that guarded its approaches." On its immediate right 17 Division
of
XV Corps launched at least 11 attacks against the trenches contiguous with those attacked by 23
Division.' Yet on not one occasion were these operations delivered simultaneously, and only once
did the artillery of a corps assist in the attack of the other.' As a consequence, both divisions
suffered something of the order of 3,500 casualties." And these losses yielded very small
advances.
If the operations
of units from different corps were conspicuously lacking in co-ordination,
operations within corps were hardly better managed. For example, while the 23 Division of III
Corps was struggling towards Contalmaison, on its left the 19 and 34 Divisions from the same
corps only once attacked simultaneously. For the most part these units confined themselves to
minor bombing operations, which were often intense and bloody but hardly distracted German
attention from the main action around Contalmaison."
A comprehensive
report from an officer who took part in some of these disastrous attacks gives
some of the flavour of the prevailing chaos. He noted that the failure to capture Contalmaison
resulted from:
- Insufficient preliminary Reconnaissance
by those responsible for executing the attack
- Lack of co-ordination between neighbouring
units as regards time of attacks, that were
disjointed and should have been simultaneous
- No proper liaison between units and those
on their flanks
- Too many attempts to gain vital ground
by bombing attacks up trenches, instead of well
mounted, well gunned, simultaneous attack in strength and numbers across the open
- Lack of properly regulated and well timed
Artillery support, and no proper liaison
between front line troops and Artillery by means of Artillery liaison officers attached to
attacking units, by which Artillery fire could have been brought to bear at vital moments.
- There was further[,] no co-ordination between
the first Artillery Barrage and the attack
of the Infantry.
- False reports from Observation Balloons.'
For good measure
he added that Contalmaison was attacked from the wrong direction, that
brigade headquarters was too far back to appreciate the situation at the front and that the
commander in charge of the battalion which attacked Contalmaison did not know his job."
The artillery found
this situation just as frustrating as the infantry. The 12 Divisional artillery
which tried to support various divisions in this period commented:
Owing
to the confused situation, uncertainty as to where exactly the enemy and our own troops
were at any moment , and observation difficulties, our fire must have been ... of little assistance
in
comparison to the expenditure of ammunition. It was the general opinion in 12th D.A. that these
suddenly staged, ill coordinated attacks on a small front were futile. R.A. had no chance to afford
real Support, while unlocated hostile M.G.s on the flanks of the attacks were left free to inflict very
heavy casualties on the infantry."
Mametz Wood
On the left, therefore,
fragmented attempts to capture Contalmaison proceeded unavailingly.
Meanwhile in the centre an operation was launched to clear one of the most formidable obstacles
between the British and the German second line. This was Mametz Wood: a mile long and a mile
wide, it was the largest of all the woods to figure in the Somme fighting. The undergrowth was
'wild and thick, and the British shelling had added to its impenetrability by bringing down many
trees in full growth.' Into the wilderness was thrown a division yet to see battle, the 38 Welsh,
which had taken over from the 7 Division on 5 July." It was directed to attack Mametz Wood
early the following day. This illustrates the haste with which operations during this period of the
battle were being made. But haste was not the only disadvantage under which the Welshmen
would labour. One of the reasons XV Corps (and particularly 7 Division) had done well on 1 July
was the employment of the creeping barrage to protect the advancing infantry. The 7 Division
was well aware of this factor, having noted it specifically as a reason for success." Yet no one
chose to pass this information on to 38 Division, which consequently had to deliver its first
operation without it.
The endeavours
of the 38 Division in the wood lasted from 7 to 11 July. During this time it
attacked on seven occasions. It acted, in all but rare instances, without support on either flank.
No operations were carried out in this period by 3 Division (XIII Corps) on its right, and the few
attempts to co-ordinate attacks with 17 Division (also from XV Corps) on its left largely failed.37
The attacks failed for a combination of reasons. Usually the brief bombardments which
accompanied them were insufficient to subdue the machine-guns in the wood; the attacking
forces were subject to fire from both flanks; untoward haste meant that orders reached troops
just moments before an attack or that the men were still struggling forward to their start lines at
zero hour. In addition, their own artillery often hit the men because insufficient time had been
taken to ascertain their exact position within the wood. Moreover the command was so out of
touch that it ordered incessant attacks without regard to the situation facing the troops.
Circumstances improved somewhat on the 8th. On that date the divisional commander (Philips)
was sacked and Watts from 7 Division took over command. The new commander at least knew
the secret of the creeping barrage and from the loth onwards the troops had the benefit of this
form of protection." Nevertheless, the fighting for Mametz Wood wrecked the division. In just
five days it suffered 4,000 casualties, including 7 of its 12 battalion commanders." It took no
further part in the Somme Campaign.
Trones Wood
Meanwhile on the
far right of the Fourth Army a portion of XIII Corps was involved in an
operation entirely separate from those of the rest of its divisions – the clearing of Trones Wood
as a preliminary to the great attack on the 14th July. This task had first fallen to 30 Division
which
had been briefly out of the line following its exertions of the first two days. It was ordered to
capture the long triangular-shaped Trones Wood on the 8th. As with Mametz Wood, all did not go
according to plan. From the 8th to the early hours of the i4th the wood was assaulted on eight
occasions, as shown below.
Date Time Strength
of attack Unit Result
8th7.15 a.m. 1
Bn 30 Div. Failure
8thi.00 p.m. 1
Bn 30 Div. Failure
9th6.40 a.m. 1
Bn 30 Div. Failure
9th6.4o a.m. 1
Bn 30 Div. Failure
11th ? 2
Bn 3 Div. Failure
11th 10.30
p.m. 1 Bn 30 Div. Failure
13 th 7.00
p.m. 2 Bn 18 Div. Failure
14th 4
.00 a.m. 2 Bn 18 Div. Success
Table compiled from
XIII Corps, 'Narrative of events 1st July-15 August 1916', WO 95/895; 21 Brigade, '30 Division
Account of Operations from July 1st-2nd', WO 95/2327; Maxse, 'Battle of the Somme: Capture of Trones
Wood, WO
95/2015; 'Account of the Operations of the 54 Brigade, Maxse Papers 63/53/7, IWM.
Conclusion
The first seven
attacks failed for the same reason: enfilade fire from three strongpoints along a
railway line which bisected the wood. Only on the eighth occasion was the location of these
strongpoints identified and an attack directed against them. As a result, the wood was cleared.
How do these three
snapshots of the front at Contalmaison, Mametz Wood, and Trones Wood fit
into the overall picture of operations between 2 and 13 July? During this period 86 battalions of
the Fourth Army launched 46 attacks against the German positions. These actions were costly.
Overall, Rawlinson's forces suffered 25,000 casualties, which took the total for thirteen days of
operations to 85,000."
These operations
were carried out in sporadic fashion and on narrow fronts. On an average day
just 14 per cent of the Fourth Army battalions attacked the enemy while the rest remained
quiescent. During the most extensive attack in this period, that of 7 July, just 26 per cent (19) of
available battalions (72) engaged the enemy. Yet even on that day the forces were not taking part
in a co-ordinated attack. In the main they fought the enemy in piecemeal fashion, two or three
battalions at a time. The maximum number that were in action at any one time was eight, and
even then the attacks were not contiguous.'
The artillery support
for these fragmented operations was no better coordinated. In most cases
nothing approaching the available artillery resources of the Fourth Army was employed. For
example on 7 July when 17 and 38 Divisions were attacking Mametz Wood the artillery of XIII
Corps on the right flank –which was not attacking that day – remained silent."
What we are observing,
then, is a succession of narrow front attacks usually launched without
adequate artillery preparation. This enabled the Germans to concentrate all their available artillery
and infantry reserves against the particular section of the front which was being assailed. And
what this ensured was that British troops had to advance through a greater weight of shell and
machine-gun fire than if the Germans had been forced to spread their resources more thinly to
meet wide-front operations.
Yet there was another
side to this. Formidable fortified areas such as La Boisselle, Contalmaison,
Mametz Wood, and Trones Wood were captured by the British in the relatively short period of 12
days. That is, where only 3 square miles had been captured on i July, the days between 2 and 13
July saw 20 square miles of German-held territory pass into British hands. As long as the
command were prepared to disregard the prodigious casualties of these 13 days (and Haig's
reaction to the casualties for the first day hardly suggested that he would respond otherwise), the
British could regard the period as one of steady achievement.
This optimistic
view could only be reinforced by the fact that British operations had indeed
reduced the Germans in the area of La Boisselle to Trones Wood to a state of considerable
disorganisation. We do not have to take the wildly exaggerated forecasts from GHQ Intelligence
about the enemy's imminent collapse at face value to acknowledge that there was at least some
basis for their hopeful reports. If not actually on the brink of collapse, the Germans were indeed
in a state of disarray. There are a number of reasons for this. First, the British operations from 2
to 13 July (along with French operations north and south of the Somme) were being delivered in
the one area where the large offensive of 1 July had dealt heavy blows to the Germans and
overrun their well-prepared front system of defences along with its garrisons. Second, a
significant proportion of German batteries in this region had fallen victim to British and French
bombardments. Third, the German position in this area was being made worse by the
determination of their high command to recover immediately every fragment of territory captured
by the British on 1 July. This meant that the Germans threw reserves into the battle helter skelter
rather than holding them back for subsequent concerted action. As a consequence all the German
reserves in the immediate area had been expended.
There was a clear
alternative to this proceeding, that of tactical withdrawal which husbanded
reserves and shortened the line. Some German commanders recognised this wisdom. On 2 July, a
subordinate commander south of the Somme sanctioned a local withdrawal just for the purpose of
straightening the line. This brought down on him the wrath of Falkenhayn. The local commander
was sacked and a stern warning issued by the commander-in-chief:
The
first principle in positional warfare must be not to give up an inch of territory and when an
inch is lost to launch a counter-attack until the last man."
It is important
to take note of this directive. We have witnessed so many examples of ineptitude
on the part of the British command that it is important to remember that they could be equalled or
exceeded by the Germans whenever the opportunity presented.
It seems certain
that the British command derived great comfort from the reasonably rapid gain
of ground made in the period from 2 to 13 July. But in doing this they were ignoring two factors.
The first was the fact that in proceeding with unrelenting, poorly planned and uncoordinated
attacks, they were incurring very heavy casualties. The second was that such a method was only
having success because of the shaken German defence. The same methods employed against
resolute Germans manning intact defences around Ovillers and La Boisselle had brought disaster.
In other words, the circumstances which made progress possible in this period would have to be
replicated if such ill-prepared and costly methods were to lead to progress in the future.
