General Sir Henry Rawlinson commanded
the British 4th Army, which was to make
the main assault to break through the German line between Maricourt and Fricourt.
The second phase of the plan was then to advance northwards along the line of the
German trenches towards Theipval.
The 4th Army consisted of five corps:
eleven divisions in the front line and five in
close support. The eleven front line divisions occupied a fifteen mile stretch of
trenches between Maricourt and Fricourt. There were two infantry divisions and one
cavalry division in reserve. The latter was to move rapidly through the gap created
by the assault and initiate the second phase of the battle.
To support Rawlinson's assault, the British
3rd Army was to mount a simultaneous
attack with two divisions on Gommecourt, and the French 6th Army astride the
River Somme was to commit three corps to attack along a front of nine miles.
In the hilly country of the Somme, the
whole system of defence, traversed by
interconnecting trenches and provided with an excellent, deep-laid telephone
network, rose `tier upon tier' on the hillsides, to a distance of four to six miles
behind the front line.5° The German trench system comprised three lines one
behind the other. Because
of the strength of the German defences, and the limited
range of his own field artillery, Rawlinson, in his early planning, decided not to
attempt to carry the second line at the first assault but to limit himself to an advance
of about 2,000 yards on a line from Mametz in the south to Serre in the north while
maintaining strong defensive positions on either flank. He would then reform, and
push forward another thousand yards to capture the German second line between
Pozieres and Grandcourt where it came nearest to the front line. During this stage
he would again stay on the defensive on both flanks.51
Haig took another line. He was convinced
that the Germans would fall back in
confusion and wished to take advantage of their disarray to capture not only their
front line but also much of their second position, and their heavy artillery, during the
first day. He also wanted a big push on both flanks, to capture the high ground
around Montauban on the right, and west of Miraumont on the left, which he
regarded as particularly important for the development of subsequent stages of the
battle.52
In spite of Rawlinson's worries about
the distance to be covered by the infantry and
about the difficulties of cutting the barbed wire in front of the second line, Rawlinson
fell in with Haig and it is his superior's plan that he finally adopted.
The details of the opening attack were
worked out at Fourth Army headquarters on
12 June, as was the broad outline of subsequent phases of the battle. Four days
later, Haig put in writing his own view of the way the battle should develop after the
first day. The attack, he wrote, should be pressed eastward far enough to enable
our cavalry to push through into the open country beyond the enemy's prepared
lines, of defence. Our object will then be to turn northwards, taking the enemy's lines
in flank and reverse.53
