All this was in
the future, however, as the 38th (Welsh) Division moved into the line from Bottom
Wood to Caterpillar Wood on 5 July. The aim of the Fourth Army was then quite clear: capture
Trones Wood on the right and Mametz Wood on the left -and do it quickly. On 6 July, Rawlinson
wrote in his journal:
The attacks by
III Corps and XV Corps against Contalmaison and Mametz Wood will be carried
out as arranged. They have fresh divisions and I hope all will go well...
Thus was the 38th
(Welsh) Division committed to battle.
On the night of
5/6 July the XV Corps had two divisions in the line: on the left, the 17th
(Northern) Division (Maj.-Gen. Pilcher), which had already been heavily engaged in the fighting,
held Quadrangle Trench up to its junction with Quadrangle Alley; on the right the 38th Division
(113th and 115th Brigades) held Bottom Wood, Cliff Trench and most of White Trench. Both
divisions were backed by artillery from the divisions which had been in the line before them; the
21st Divisional artillery covering the 17th Division on the left and the 7th Divisional artillery
covering the 38th Division on the right. At that time, the boundary between XV Corps and XIII
Corps lay on the western edge of Caterpillar Wood which was occupied by the 18th Division
(XIII Corps).
On 6 July, in preparation
for the next day's attack by XV Corps, there was a general reshuffle to
the right, the 17th (Northern) Division taking over Bottom Wood, and the 38th (Welsh) Division
the western half of Caterpillar Wood and also Marlborough Wood (the most forward position of
all). Facing them were units of the German 3rd Guards Division and the 28th Reserve Division.14
Mametz Wood itself was held by a battalion of the Lehr Regiment of the Prussian Guard, another
battalion of the regiment being in position around Flatiron Copse.15 On their right the 163rd
Regiment (attached to 28th Reserve Division) defended Contalmaison and the open ground
between Quadrangle Trench and the western edge of the wood.
For the 7th July,
XV Corps planned a two-pronged attack upon the wood at 8 am, the 17th
Division attacking Acid Drop Copse and the strip of wood LMNK from the west (the lettering is
that used on the operational maps of the time - see Map 8), and the 38th Division attacking the
'Hammerhead' (so called because of its shape - AXCB in Map 8) on the eastern side of the
wood. Once they had entered the wood, both divisions were to advance towards the central ride
before swinging northward up through the wood.The 38th Division was given the additional task
of sweeping across the southern portion of the wood to take Strip Trench from the rear. As a
preliminary to the main attack, and to protect the left flank, the 17th Division was to attack and
capture Quadrangle Support trench and those parts of Pearl Alley and Quadrangle Alley leading
up to it. This was to be done under cover of darkness, starting at 2 am after an intense artillery
bombardment of the enemy positions. It was assumed that this attack, completely unsupported on
either flank and against strongly defended positions, would be successful, if not at first, at least
as
the night wore on. The only concession to failure was that the main attack would be postponed
from 8 am to 8.30 am if at that time Quadrangle support trench was still in enemy hands. This
contingency plan was called 'Scheme B'.16
The main attack
was to be preceded by a heavy bombardment of the German second line, and of
strong points in and around the wood, to a rigorous timetable laid down by the artillery
commander of XV Corps.17 This bombardment was to start at 7.20 am and last for forty
minutes. Both supporting divisional artilleries (the 21st on the left now reinforced by one artillery
brigade from 38th Division; the 7th on the right) were to 'search' the wood thoroughly during this
time using every available 4.5 howitzer and 18- pounder, with concentrated fire on those edges of
the wood which were to come under attack from the infantry. In this preliminary bombardment
special attention was to be paid to Acid Drop Copse on the left and Flatiron and Sabot Copses on
the right which were known to harbour German machine guns. The corps heavy artillery would
back up by bombarding the same targets, and their massive 9.2 inch batteries would fire on the
German second line. Once the attack had been launched, all guns would be lifted by strict
timetable ahead of the planned position of the infantry, until by 9.30 all fire would be concentrated
on targets beyond the wood. In the event of 'Scheme B' being put into operation, the artillery
would concentate at 8 am on the area around Quadrangle Support before moving on, half an hour
later, to the main programme.
On the 38th Division's
front, the task of attacking the wood fell to Brig.-Gen. Horatio Evans and
his 115th Brigade. At 8 am on 6 July - some two hours before XV Corps issued its detailed
orders - the GSO 1 of the 38th Division (Lt.Col. ap Rhys Pryce) arrived at brigade headquarters
and gave Evans a brief outline of the task he was to perform, namely to attack the southeast
portion of Ihe wood from Caterpillar Wood at 8 am the following morning. No mention was made
of an advance to the central ride or of the subsequent drive northward through the wood. This
suggests that the divisional staff were not at thic rim/. AWAre of the extent of the XV Corps'
plans.
Together, Evans
and Rhys Pryce went over to Caterpillar Wood to reconnoitre the ground. On
the way, they were told by a neighbouring brigade that nothing definite was known about the
number of German troops in Mametz Wood but that it appeared to be held right up to the edges,
though not in any great strength. When they reached Caterpillar Wood, the brigadier reconnoitred
the ground immediately to the north and west of the wood, while the staff officer went on to
Marlborough Wood. During his survey, Evans observed that troops could be assembled safely in
a dip in the ground north of Caterpillar Wood provided they were not pushed too far up the hill
towards Bazentin le Grand Wood. It also became clear to him that as the subsequent attack
would have to be made over ground which could easily be swept by machine gun fire from the
north, it would be prudent to keep as close as possible to the valley running along the northern
edge of Caterpillar Wood (see Map 8), and to attack on a narrow frontage, one battalion wide,
supported by machine guns and trench mortars in Caterpillar and Marlborough woods. When he
met up with Lt.Col. ap Rhys Pryce later, Brig.-Gen. Evans explained his plans and pointed out
where he would form up his four battalions in the valley before the attack. He asked the staff
officer to make 'special provision' for his right flank to protect it from machine gun fire.18 The
two men then parted, Rhys Pryce returning to prepare divisional orders, Evans to arrange the
disposition of his battalions. He reached his headquarters between 2 and 3 o'clock in the
afternoon and immediately ordered his machine gun and trench mortar commanders to make their
own reconnaissance and report back. He alerted the commanding officers of the 16th Welsh
(Cardiff City) Battalion, which he intended should lead the attack, and the 11th SWB (2nd
Gwent) and 10th SWB (1st Gwent), which were to be in support, telling them also to survey the
land and then stand by for further orders. The commanding officer of the 16th Welsh, realising
that the right flank of his battalion would be exposed to fire from Flatiron Copse, asked to be
allowed to assemble in the dark and attack at first light. He had to be told that planswetr
synchronised with those of the 17th Division and it was too late to change."
Later that afternoon,
Maj.-Gen. Philipps visited brigade headquarters briefly and hinted at the
possibility of a more ambitious objective than the Hammerhead at the edge of the wood. Pressed
for details, he said that they would all act ear in divisional orders which would be issued shortly.
Soon after he had gone, brigade received a message to move the 16th Welsh and 11th SWB into
their preliminary positions near Loop Trench (Map 7) by 9 pm and then on to Caterpillar Wood by
2 am on 7 July. Brig.-Gen. Evans went off to supervise their assembly leaving draft orders with
the brigade major who was instructed to issue them, with any necessary corrections, as soon as
divisional orders had been received.
The divisional
orders were issued at 8.30 pm. The assembly points for the four battalions were
roughly as discussed earlier by Evans and Rhys Pryce, that is, two battalions in Caterpillar Wood
valley, another in Caterpillar Wood itself, and the fourth in reserve a little further back towards
Montauban Alley and Loop Trench,21 but on hearing of these dispositions corps headquarters
immediately intervened:
The
corps commander considers that it is dangerous to collect more than two battalions in the
western end of Caterpillar Wood and valleys in the vicinity owing to the danger of hostile shell
fire if the troops are overcrowded. Two battalions are sufficient for the attack on the eastern
projection of the wood with a third in support in Montauban Alley and a fourth further back. Any
further reinforcements required in the wood should enter by the southern tongue [H in Map 8]
which the division should be able to capture without difficulty when the troops have entered the
wood from the east, and assisted by those from the west, are clearing up the southern portion of
the wood.22
Divisional orders
were amended accordingly. Evans arrived back at his headquarters at 11 pm to
find his brigade major struggling to reconcile the draft brigade orders with those from the division.
He was appalled when he saw the detail and complexity of the divisional orders. Capt. Wyn
Griffith, on the brigade staff, witnessed his reaction:
The
general was cursing...at his orders. lie said that only a madman could have issued them. lie
called the divisional staff a lot of plumbers, herring-gutted at that. He argued at the time, and
asked for some control over the artillery that 23 is going to cover us, but he got nothing out of
them.
This is perhaps
a little hard on the divisional staff whose orders merely repeated, with some
elaboration, those given earlier in the day by corps headquarters. The rigid artillery programme
was none of their doing and some of the elaboration -for a smoke screen to be laid south of
Flatiron and Sabot copses, for example - was distinctly helpful and in accordance with Evans's
own request. However it was not just the artillery programme that worried Evans. He was aghast
at what he took to be instructions to attack on a two battalion frontage when he had been at such
pains to explain to Rhys Pryce his reasons for wanting only one battalion in the front line. 'It
appears to me now,' he was to write later, 'that the dispositions were all cut and dried by
divisional headquarters and that the reconnaissance was simply made to satisfy them and that I
was a mere figurehead. I was given no discretion in the matter. These dispositions were the first
intimation that the attack was to be made on a two battalion frontage.'24 There is, in fact, no
evidence that this is what divisional headquarters intended. A close examination of the orders
issued on 6 July shows no reference at all to the position of the battalions at the moment of
attack, only to their dispositions beforehand in and around Caterpillar Wood.25
Be that as it may,
Evans faced the formidable task of implementing, within a few short hours, a
plan far more ambitious and much more detailed than anything he had been led to expect and
which, as he saw it, required a complete revision of all his previous plans. He worked as quickly
as possible to produce new orders but it was 2 am (on 7 July) before they were issued. Under the
revised arrangements, 11th South Wales Borderers were to be on the left of the attack (with their
left flank as close as possible to Caterpillar Wood) and 16th Welsh on the right, each facing
northwest and each covering about 250 yards of frontage. As the right of the 16th Welsh would
now be perilously close to the German-hcld Flatiron Copse, they were to form under cover of the
7.45 am. 6
As soon as these
order had been issued, Evans left to rearrange the position of his troops.
