December 1915 to January 1916
The 38th (Welsh) Division marched into Southampton on 1st December
1915 'in an even drive of
wind and rain, into a late afternoon that found us on a wet quayside, staring at a grey ship on a
grey sea. Rain in England, rain in the Channel and rain in France; mud on the Hampshire Downs
and mud in the unfinished horse- standings in Havre where we sheltered
from the rain during
hours of waiting for a train.'1
Five days later, 526 officers; 15,447 other ranks; 1,580 horses and mules; 526 horse-drawn
vehicles; 515 bicycles; 70 lorries; 36 cars; 29 motor cycles and other paraphernalia of the division
had reached a billeting area 10 miles south of St. Omer and about 30 miles behind the British front
line.3 Here they joined the XI Corps in the centre of the British First Army. Here they were to
replace the 46th (North Midland) Division, a territorial unit, which was in reserve at St. Venant
having come out of the line a few days before the arrival of the 38th. For the first four weeks in
France, the 38th Division trained continuously for this role, both in and out of the line:
They
did short route marches each day along winding ways saturated with continued rain. They did platoon-
drill and arm- drill in soggy fields behind their billets. They were given lectures on very wet days
in the barn...
lectures on military tactics that would be more or less commonly understood. Lectures on hygiene by
the
medical officer, who was popular, who glossed his technical discourses with every lewdness...
One
day the Adjutant addressed them on the history of the Regiment. Lectures by the Bombing Officer: he
sat
in the straw, a mild young man, who told them lightly of the efficacy of his trade; he predicted an
important
future for the new Mills Mk.IV grenade, just on the market; he discussed the improvised jam-tins of
the
veterans, of the bombs of after the Marne, grenades of Loos and Laventie - he compared these elementary,
amateurish, inefficiencies with the compact and supremely satisfactory invention of this Mr Mills, to
whom his
country was so greatly indebted.
He
took the names of all those men professing efficiency on the cricket field - more particularly those
who
claimed to bowl effectively - and brushing away with his hand pieces of straw from his breeches, he
sauntered off with his sections of grenades and fuses and explanatory diagrams of their mechanism stuffed
into the pockets of his raincoat, like a departing commercial traveller. 15
Bombing practice soon followed, at which most men threw at least one live bomb, and
those
selected to be bombers threw ten or more. Faulty grenades and occasional carelessness in
handling made this a hazardous exercise in which a number of officers and men were killed, and
others wounded. On the rifle ranges, the most accurate shots were trained as snipers, while the
rest practised to bring their rate of fire up to 15 aimed rounds a minute - a fairly respectable rate,
even if well short of the 30 rounds a minute claimed to have been achieved by the best of the
regulars in the pre-war army. The troops also learned the basics of field engineering; how to revet
earthworks with sandbags and timber; how to drain and pump; how to construct new traverses and
dugouts. Machine gun crews fired live ammunition for the first time and elementary training was
given in gas warfare, all officers and men passing through a tunnel of gas wearing the primitive gas
helmets of the time.1
Between 10 December 1915 and 6 January 1916, battalions of the division were attached
in turn to
units of the two divisions in the front line to learn at first hand the business of trench warfare.17
Wyn Griffith recalled his own feelings as he faced this initiation into the brotherhood
of the trenches:
Less
than twenty-four hours stood between us and the trenches; there were two kinds of men in the world -
those who had been in the trenches and the rest. We were to graduate from the one class to the other,
to be
reborn into the old age and experience of the front line, by the traversing of two miles over the fields
of
Flanders.18
The journey itself, across the churned-up, waterlogged valley of the River Lys, brought
its own
unpleasant experiences; unwelcome encounters with rotting corpses, huge rats and ice-cold water:
Appear
more Lazarus figures, where water gleamed between dilapidated breastworks, blue slime coated,
ladling with wooden ladles; rising, bending, at their trenches dredging.
They
speak low. Cold gurgling followed their labours.
They
lift things, and a bundle-thing out; its shapelessness sags.
From
this muck- raking are singular stenches, long decay leavened; compounding this clay with that more
precious, patient of baptism; chemical-corrupted once-bodies...
You
step down between inward inclining, heavy bulged, walls of earth; you feel the lateral slats firm foothold.
Squeaking, bead-eyed hastening, many footed hurrying, accompanying each going forward.
Break
in the boards - pass it back
The
fluid mud is icily discomforting that circles your thighs...
The troops soon became absorbed in the dull routine of trench life: stand-to at dawn
and dusk in
case the enemy attacked in the half light, and at other times repairing trench walls, renewing
barbed-wire, carrying stores and ammunition, and `scheming against the insidious attack of
water'.20 This work was mainly carried out at night:
Most
of the daytime - invariably in the morning - the three lines, firing, support and reserve, were deserted
except for a few sentries leaning against the parapet with periscopes handy, and for a sniper or two;
everyone else was under cover, silent and, if possible, asleep. At dark a whole population suddenly
appeared, literally out of the earth; working parties would set about draining, digging and wiring;
from the rear,
along the communication trenches, would come parties carrying rations, water, ammunition, sandbags,
duck-
boards, and everything imaginable. Behind these again the roads were packed with horsed wagons and
limbers...Then dawn would approach, the trench garrison would stand to arms and be dismissed to begin
another similar day.21
On Christmas Eve, the artillery began to arrive from England and by 27 December the
division was
complete. At about the same time, the 46th Division departed for Egypt, leaving the 38th (Welsh)
Division as corps reserve. By 6 January, the training programme was over and two complete
brigades - the 113th and 114th - moved into the line to relieve a brigade each of the Guards and
19th Divisions, still under the eyes of experienced divisional commanders, but responsible, for the
first time, for whole sectors of the front line system. On 12 January, the 113th Brigade
had its first
break with routine, making a demonstration with 200 plywood dummy soldiers 'as if getting over the
parapet'.22 It repeated this ruse three times to represent three waves of infantry, while the artillery
heavily shelled the German front line in the hope that the German infantry would have left their dug-
outs to defend it.
'From the increase in rifle fire, it appears he reinforced his front line', wrote
the XI Corps diarist,
anxious to attribute a measure of success to this elementary piece of deception.
A few days later, the corps commander, Lt.-Gen. R Haking, satisfied with the division's
progress,
ordered Maj.-Gen. Philipps to prepare to take over the line from 19th Division with these words of
approbation:
Now
that the 38th Division has completed its training in the trenches, and is about to take over half the
front
occupied by XI Corps, I wish to convey to all ranks my appreciation of the manner in which they have
set to
work to make themselves efficient...
Although,
of course, a good deal remains yet to be done, this division has made more rapid strides towards
efficiency than any of the several new formations that I have had under my command during the campaign.
Now
that you are about to take over part of our line I anticipate with confidence that you will dominate
the
enemy in front of you; that your offensive spirit will be far superior to his; that your patrolling,
sniping, trench
mortar, bombing, infantry, artillery and engineer work will be better than his, and that with careful
reconnaissance work and preparation you will shortly be able to continue the raids on his trenches which
have already been carried out with such success by other divisions of the corps.23
This emphasis on ascendancy, on 'dominating the enemy in front', was common to most
corps and
army commanders at that time. David Jones's ironic description of the chaos that ensues when,
unwittingly, a party of Royal Welsh Fusiliers runs into a German patrol at night:
The
thudding and breath to breath you don't know which way, what way, you count eight of him in a flare-
space, you can't find the lane [ie the gap in the wire] - the one way - you rabbit to and fro, you could
cry...
We
maintain ascendancy in no-man's-land.25
'Nothing to report', is a frequent entry in the 38th Division's diary. The following
extract from a 38th
Division tactical progress report describes a typical day in January 1916.26
Tactical Progress Report No.7
Right Sector
In the fog, this
morning, two Germans were seen approaching one of our posts in the right
sub-sector. The post with considerable restraint lay low, and 'Hands upped' the Germans
when they were within 30 yards. From reports at present to hand, it would appear that these
men belonged to the 55th Guard Reserve Regiment...
A listening post
at Boar's Head located enemy's working party half way across no-man's
land...Yesterday morning at `stand-to' the Germans opposite Copse St. - Mole St. were
heard to shout several times 'Who are you' while those further on our right shouted 'You
bloody murderers'. This is eminently satisfactory if it indicates that our activity has been
giving them a thin time...The machine gun mentioned in yesterday's report to be firing from
the high breastwork behind Boar's Head did not reply to the fire of our machine guns for the
first time. An officer was observed through a telescope to come up and speak to a man near
point 95 [unidentifiable on trench map]. This officer wore a coat closed up at the throat and
had a high straight collar. His cap was shaped like ours, and was blue in colour with a red
band round it. His face seemed very pale but he looked particularly clean.
Left Sector
A searchlight which
we attempted to use on the Orchard did not prove a success, the beam
not being apparently powerful enough. Strong wire is reported [south of the Orchard]: two
whistles were heard playing in the German lines. 'I've got my eye on you' appeared to be the
tune. An officer's patrol from The Neb saw no sign of enemy work, hut a strong enemy patrol
was seen. Mining is suspected near The Neb, the men reporting the noise being
experienced miners. Necessary precautions have been Liken and investigations are being
made. Opposite the right sub sector, Left Sector, the enemy appears to occupy an old
communication trench in no-man's-land as Very lights were Seen coming from it. Opposite
the left sub-sector, the enemy were laughing and talking and playing mouth organs during
the early part of the night. An officer's patrol from The Neb followed the willows to the wire
near the German trenches. They heard talking and posts being hammered in, apparently in
front of the parapet for wiring. On receipt of the patrol's report, machine gun fire was opened
on the spot.
February 1916
In mid-February, the Guards Division transferred to the Second Army. The 19th Division
replaced it
in the line and the 35th Division joined the corps to bring it up to strength. At the same time, the
whole corps moved sideways to the south and the 38th (Welsh) Division took over at Festubert,
where for a while it had three brigades in the line together. At Festubert the ground was low lying
and completely waterlogged. The front line consisted of a series of isolated posts called 'islands',
each held by a garrison of from 10 to 20 men. These posts were all that remained of a once
continuous front line which elsewhere had been washed away. On the islands themselves the
parapets were barely bullet-proof and dug-out accommodation was almost non- existent.
Communication trenches were flooded and the islands could only be reached across open ground.
As the German front line was only 200 yards away, and on slightly higher ground, the islands were
unapproachable by day. 100 yards behind the islands was a rudimentary support trench, again
barely habitable, and further back the old British line of 1915, where most of the front line fighters
were garrisoned, though even this was broken down in places and sadly lacking in dug-outs. In
these miserable conditions, the Welsh Division spent most of its time draining the land an
improving the defences. There was little time for fighting. Brigades in reserve did very little formal
training. Days were spent on fatigues or on working parties or what was euphemistically called
'company training' which seldom went beyond platoon and company drills.29
A few specialists, and those chosen to
raid enemy trenches in their next venture
into the line, were given an opportunity to practise their skills, but not until the end of
May were brigades asked to train larger formations," and by then the coming
offensive was only weeks away. Part of the difficulty was that the British army, unlike
the French, did not have a local civilian work force and infantry out of the line tended
to be used as casual labour.
A few weeks later, however, the corps absorbed the 33rd Division, extending its frontage
further
southward to Cuinchy. and Auchy beyond the La Bassee Canal, and the 38th Division again
shuffled south, exchanging the watery wastes of Festubert for slightly drier, but less restful
surroundings at Givenchy.
Givenchy was notorious as an area which was actively mined by the Germans:
A
mile to the north stood Festubert, where men fought more with water than with fellow men; a mile or
two to
the south the trenches were dry, but on Givenchy hill there was no respite from fire or flood, nor from
that
devil's volcano of a sprung mine. To stand in the trench was to wait to be blown up, without warning,
from
below, or to be struck down by some terror from the sky in the shape of a bomb, grenade or she11.28
March to April 1916
The activity was not, however, all one-sided and at his conference on 8 March the
corps
commander gave the division his greatest accolade: he congratulated it for gaining 'ascendency'
over the enemy through its activities on the Givenchy front.
At the end of March, the 39th Division, newly arrived from England, joined the XI
Corps for training,
bringing its total strength up to five divisions, all new army, reflecting the preponderence of new
army divisions on the Western Front at that time. Six brigades were in reserve.
But although the front line was quiet, it was not without its hazards. Snipers' bullets
and bursting
shells on the one hand, and continual exposure to mud and water on the other, took a steady toll.
During March and April, the Swansea battalion alone drafted in 100 officers and men a month,
equivalent to more than 1,000 a month for the whole division. 7
May-June 1916
In April, May and early June, the 38th Division carried out at least six raids on
German trenches,
some successful, some not, depending in the main on how effectively the defensive barbed wire
had been cut beforehand. In most places, the opposing lines were too close together for the wire to
be cut by shell fire and the favourite alternative device was a 'Bangalore torpedo' - a long tube filled
with explosive, which, when it worked (and frequently it did not), blew a wide path through the wire
capable of admitting men three abreast. On 10 May, the 10th Welsh placed a torpedo successfully
in position under the German wire, but, instead of exploding, it fizzled away in full view of the
German line. As the Bangalore torpedo was supposed to be secret, an officer and a lance-corporal
had to risk their lives trying to retrieve it. With all element of surprise lost, the raid was called
off.37
Even when the wire was successfully cut and the German trenches entered, there still
remained a
hazardous return to the British line amidst retaliatory fire from rifles and machine guns, and it was
at this stage that most casualties were suffered. A typical example was the raid by four officers
and 51 men of the 15th RWF (London Welsh) on the German trenches north of Farquissart, to
where the division had moved in the middle of April. On this raid, which took place on the night of
7/8th May, the wire was cut quietly by hand by an advance party and the raiders, divided into two
parties to increase the chances of success, reached the German parapet unobserved:
Right
and left parties filed into action. Both were surprised at the number of enemy in adjacent bays and
along
the traffic way. The Germans stood sandwiched together, some without equipment and arms, which seems
to show that they did not constitute the ordinary garrison of the trench.
Although
they could offer no opposition, they blocked Ole way of the bombers. Realising that there was a
delay in front, some bombers on the parapet started to bomb successive bays to right and to left from
the
ditch, outside the parapet. In this way they helped to clear up the bays in front of the bombers who
were in
the trenches bombing around the traverses. Right party also encountered a narrow communication trench
also congested with Germans. The enemy in this trench was vigorously bombed and his casualties were
severe...Left party also found progress slow on account of the density of the enemy. At one point a
general
rush was made by the occupants of a bay to a bomb store but before they could secure any bombs...they
were put out of action by our leading bombers. Numerous attempts to gain this store by the enemy were
prevented by steady bombing. Enemy casualties were heavy here.38
After 13 minutes of intense activity during which more than 200 bombs were thrown
and 50 yards of
German trench occupied, the raid commander, Captain Owen, decided to withdraw. Until then,
neither raiding party had suffered a single casualty but as they retired, machine guns and rifles
opened fire on them and two men were killed and nine wounded; two young officers and one man
also failed to return, either killed or captured. Nevertheless, it was estimated that at least 50
Germans had been killed or wounded and the raid was considered a success. When the news
reached the corps commander, General Haking was full of praise for the 'fine fighting spirit' of the
15th RWF and he rated the raid as the third most successful on his front since early December.
On his recommendation, the battalion was mentioned in Sir Douglas Haig's despatches.39
On 17 May, the division lost one of its most senior officers. Lt.Col. F Gaskell, commanding
officer
of the 16th Welsh which he himself had raised at Cardiff, was mortally wounded when visiting his
men at a crater in no-man's-land. His second in command, Major Frank Smith took over the
battalion.
General Haking made plans for several
raids to be carried out simultaneously in
early June. Divisional commanders were asked to make proposals for a 'somewhat
larger raid than usual' though each was unaware that other divisions would also be
involved. By this means, Haking hoped to keep from the Germans any inkling that
something special was afoot. At the last moment, however, he was told by First
Army that 'The Commander-in-Chief has decided that, in view of the proximity of
offensive operations on our part and the consequent undesirability in these
circumstances of disturbing the front and expending a quantity of ammunition which
might otherwise bebetter employed, the simultaneous raids which were to have
been carried out on the night of the 3/4 June are not to take place' 4° The corps
commander was, however, allowed to make such raids as he 'considered
desirable from time to limp,' and acting on this, the 38th Division launched three
raids against the German line in quick succession. Two, by the 14th RWF and 14th
Welsh Battalions, were successful in reaching and entering the German trenches,
but the third, by the 10th Welsh, was held up on the wire, three men being killed and
all four officers and nine men wounded. A few nights earlier, however, the 10th
Welsh, with a great burst of activity had in one night dug a trench half way across no-
man's-land towards the German line. This trench - known thereafter as Rhondda
sap - was to be used a month later as a launching point for a heavy attack on the
German line, during the ill-fated battle of Fromelles.41
On 11 and 12 June the two infantry brigades in the line, and the divisional artillery,
were relieved by
units of the newly arrived 61st Division and the 38th marched south to prepare for the Battle of the
Somme. After six months in the trenches, the trek south through the hills of Artois brought a great
sense of freedom and, momentarily, of relief from the cares of war:
The
marching in good air was leaving its mark on us all, and we were gaining a release from the humiliating
burden of mud that had clogged our pores and turned our thoughts into its own greyness. We walked with
a
swing, we sang on the march; men began to laugh, to argue and even quarrel, a sure sign of recovery
from
the torpor of winter. We were going into a battle, true enough, from which few of us could hope to return,
but
at the moment we were many miles from war, and the hedges were rich with dog-rose and honeysuckle; we
were seeing the old flowers in a new country.42
On 15 June, the division joined the XVII Corps (Third Army) at St Pol and moved into
a new training
area just east of the village, where it began to train seriously for offensive action. The training
programme which GHQ had issued a few weeks earlier laid down that divisions were to train not
only to attack on a large scale against enemy trenches and strong points, but also to follow
through once the enemy defences had been broken:
Divisions must, therefore, be practised in [he passing of a fresh body of attacking
troops through
the troops which have carried out the first assault and have reached their objective. The second
attack will be carried out on the same principles, the assaulting columns going straight through to
the objective in successive lines.43
On 16 June, the division dug a system of trenches on which to practise its manoeuvres.
Here it
was at a disadvantage; being in GHQ reserve and not yet destined for any particular part of the front
line, the division was unable to reproduce the features of the ground over which it would eventually
fight. This was to prove of great significance. When the division later went into battle it was faced
with a large, heavily defended wood but woodland fighting, despite the wooded nature of the
Somme countryside, had not been included in the training programme 44
For the first six days of training, platoons and companies practised going into attack
over open
ground in extended lines, or 'waves', each successive wave carrying the action forward as the one
in front supposed itself in check. This was followed by three days of brigade and divisional
manoeuvres in which, for the first time in France, all arms joined: artillery brigades, machine gun
companies, signallers and engineers, aided by spotter aircraft from the Royal Flying Corps.
Each unit was given a definite objective and detailed orders were issued by divisional
and brigade
headquarters. Annex A shows the orders issued by the 113rd Infantry Brigade (Brig.Gen. Price-
Davies) for a mock attack on trenches representing the German second and third lines on 24 June.
For this attack, which was supported by a full artillery brigade, the 113th used all its available
forces: two battalions in the initial assault and two for the capture of the final objective. Though
the
absence of an enemy must have lent an air of unreality to the proceedings, the brigade staff were,
nevertheless, given an opportunity to handle large forces in the open and to practise the difficult
manoeuvre of passing onebattalion through another. As the attack proceeded, unit commanders
were deliberately confronted with unexpected difficulties. Some, for example, were told that they
had advanced into their own artillery fire; others that formations to right or left had been held up
by
the enemy and were in need of assistance. Until appropriate action was taken, the unit concerned
was deemed to have suffered casualties on a scale determined by watching umpires.45
On 26 June the division marched west of Doullens, where it came under the command
of GOC II
Corps, still in GHQ reserve, and then south- eastwards to Toutencourt which it reached on 30 June -
the eve of the Battle of the Somme. Here the division was in the territory of the British Fourth
Army, which had been formed under General Sir Henry Rawlinson on 1st March, and waited for
orders, prepared to move at six hours notice.46
